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STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
AS LAW DEVELOPMENT
Victor Eugene Flango*
I. KEY ROLES OF APPELLATE COURTS
The controversy over Justice Sotomayor's statement that
the "Court of Appeals is where policy is made" illustrates that
there is still confusion over the role of appellate courts.' That
confusion is exacerbated by the recent movement toward
measuring judicial productivity by opinion production, as noted
below.
Appellate courts have two primary functions: "error
correction" to ensure that law is interpreted correctly and
consistently and "law making" to provide a means for the
development of law through their decisions and explanations of
decisions.2 In states with only one appellate court, that one court
must perform both functions. In states with two levels of
appellate courts, the intermediate appellate court is often
assigned the error-correcting role and the court of last resort,
most often called the supreme court,3 is primarily concerned
* Executive Director, Program Resource Development, National Center for State Courts.
Opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the
National Center for State Courts. The author would like to express his appreciation to
Shauna Strickland for providing the data for this article in a useable format and to Nora
Sydow for her assistance in manipulating the tables and charts created in Microsoft Excel
format.
1. The story was widely reported; the quote here is from the Christian Broadcasting
Network. See Conservatives Down on "Policy Maker" Sotomayor, http://www.cbn.com/
cbnnews/politics/2009/May/Conservatives-Down-on-Policy-Maker-Sotomayor (May 27,
2009) (accessed May 17, 2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
2. Daniel John Meador and Jordana Simone Bernstein, Appellate Courts in the United
States 4 (West 1994).
3. The highest court in each state is usually called the Supreme Court. In the District
of Columbia, Maryland, and New York, the Court of Last Resort is called the Court of
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with the development and declaration of law. Indeed, a primary
rationale for the creation of intermediate appellate courts is to
dispose of the bulk of appeals so that supreme courts can focus
on cases with significant policy implications or cases of high
salience to the public. More than thirty years ago, a group of
scholars noted that they had observed
an emerging societal consensus that state supreme courts
should not be passive, reactive bodies, which simply
applied "the law" to correct "errors" or miscarriages of
justice in individual cases, but that these courts should be
policy-makers and, at least in some cases, legal innovators.4
As courts of last resort, state supreme courts have the final
authority on issues most basic to people's lives. In the words of
Professor Rosenblum:
[I]n the complex system of government we adopted, most
questions of private law were left to the states. The national
government had almost no part in establishing or
developing the law of property, contracts, wills, personal
injury or damages.. . . [W]ithin the states it was often the
courts rather than the legislatures that actually formulated
such law.5
Moreover, state courts of last resort "interpret not only state
laws but also federal laws," and in the process, they "contribute
significantly to public policy." Justice Brennan acknowledged
as much when he wrote that "state courts have responded with
marvelous enthusiasm to many not-so-subtle invitations to fill
the constitutional gaps left by the decisions of the Supreme
Appeals; in Maine and Massachusetts the highest court is called the Supreme Judicial
Court; and in West Virginia the highest court in the state is called the Supreme Court of
Appeals. The names "supreme court" and "court of last resort" will be used
interchangeably here for any of these bodies.
4. Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Laurence M. Friedman & Stanton Wheeler,
The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 961, 983 (1978); see also Robert
Leflar Internal Operating Procedures of Appellate Courts 1-2, 5-6 (Am. B. Found. 1976)
(noting that appeals are no longer "heard only for the purpose of correcting errors
committed in trial courts" and that "the lawmaking function of appellate courts is more
clearly recognized").
5. Victor Rosenblum, Courts and Judges: Power and Politics, in The 50 States and
Their Local Governments 406 (James W. Fesler ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1967).
6. Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Comparing Courts Using the American States,
83 Judicature 250, 253 (Mar.-Apr. 2000).
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Court."7 Professors Stumpf and Culver argue that the trend
continued as the Burger and Rehnquist courts became more
deferential to state courts, with the Supreme Court "literally
inviting an increased activism in state judicial policy-making,
and in many instances state supreme courts have displayed their
willingness, if not at times their eagerness, to move into the
vacuum."8
If this trend continues, the state supreme courts will
increasingly "'define the quality of life' in American states and
communities."9 It is interesting to note that a very recent poll
showed that seventy-one percent of Americans say their state
supreme court should keep its ability to decide controversial
issues, and sixty-eight percent believe that the courts either have
the appropriate amount of power or should be awarded even
greater power.' 0 (Only twenty-four percent thought the state
legislature and the governor should have more power over the
courts.)"
Another indication of state supreme courts' increased role
in policy making is the renewed interest in election of judges
and justices. According to Roger Warren, both a former judge
and a former president of the National Center for State Courts,
7. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 549 (1986); see
also Assoc. Press, Brennan Says State Courts Protect Rights, Star-Banner (Ocala, Fla.)
10A (Apr. 12, 1987). Justice Brennan intended to give a speech in which the quoted
statement also appears on April 26, 1987, but hoarseness prevented him from speaking that
night; the text of the speech was nonetheless released to the press. Stuart Taylor, Jr.,
Brennan Hails State Courts'Record on Liberty, 135 N.Y. Times A28 (Apr. 27, 1987).
8. Harry P. Stumpf & John H. Culver, The Politics of State Courts 137 (Longman
Publg. Group 1992). They state further that "despite the ebb and flow of state power, state
appellate courts remain major players in the overall growth of American law." Id.
9. Id. at 156 (quoting Elder Witt, State Supreme Courts: Tilting the Balance Toward
Change, 1 Governing 30 (1988)).
10. The survey of 1,200 American adults was conducted by Princeton Survey Research
Associates International for the National Center for State Courts, and has a margin of error
of plus or minus 2.8 percent, nineteen times out of twenty. The poll was paid for by NCSC,
the Pew Center on the States, and the State Justice Institute. Complete results, including a
report from the pollsters, are available in .pdf format on the NCSC website. See National
Center for State Courts, Separate Branches, Shared Responsibilities: Highlights from an
NCSC Public Opinion Survey, http://www.ncsc.org/Web%20Document%2OLibrary/
PublicationsSeparateBranches.aspx (May 2009) (click "More" on summary page to reach
survey results in .pdf form) (accessed May 17, 2010; copy of summary page on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
11. Id.
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[s]tate judicial elections have become increasingly like
elections for political office: expensive, contentious,
partisan, political, and dominated by special interests. . . .
Electing state court judges attuned to a particular special
interest or ideology, and defeating those not so attuned, is
increasingly viewed by political parties and special
interests as politics-and business-as usual.' 2
II. OPINIONS AS THE MECHANISM FOR DEVELOPING THE LAW
As the weakest branch of government, courts have no way
to enforce their will except through their powers of persuasion.
Indeed, the following observation about the United States
Supreme Court really applies to all courts of last resort: "The
power of the Supreme Court manifests itself in many forms,
including in structural prestige and the reputation of individual
justices, but is expressed through only one form: the written
legal opinion."' Thus, the appellate process requires that courts
provide the reasons behind their decisions. In the words of
Professor Stone, "[t]he legitimacy of the judicial branch rests
largely on the responsibility of judges to explain and justify their
decisions in opinions that can be publicly read, analyzed, and
12. Roger K. Warren, Politicizing America's State Courts: Critical Challenges Facing
the Judiciary, Cal. Cts. Rev. 6, 6 (Winter 2007). He also notes that campaign contributions
to candidates for state supreme courts increased more than 750 percent between 1990 and
2004. Candidate fundraising broke records in nineteen states in 2000 and 2004, and at least
four more states in 2006. Successful supreme court candidates now sometimes raise more
money than gubernatorial or U.S. Senate candidates. Id. at 9. A related challenge,
according to Warren, is that "judicial candidates are now free to-and are pressured to-
announce their views on hot-button social and political issues" since Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), in which the Supreme Court held that a Minnesota
canon prohibiting a candidate from "'announcing his or her views on disputed legal or
political issues' violated a candidate's freedom of speech." Warren, supra this note, at 11
(paraphrasing White, 536 U.S. at 768). As a result of White, Warren notes that Supreme
Court candidates "blatantly announced their views on abortion, gun possession, right to
life, gay marriage, and other disputed legal and political issues." Id. And, he notes, "[o]nce
judicial candidates were free to express their views," special interests distributed
questionnaires eliciting them. Id.
13. M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of
Dissent, http://www.law.uchicago.edulfiles/files/363.pdf, at 3 n. 15 (U. Chi. L. Sch., John
M. Olin Program in L. & Econ., Working Paper Series, Oct. 2007) (accessed May 19,
2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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criticized."' 4 Full opinions-those that offer a justification for
decisions and the reasoning behind them-guide the decisions of
lower courts, and should be issued whenever the courts
announce a new rule of law, resolve a conflict between
subordinate courts, make a non-unanimous decision, or make a
decision of substantial interest to the public.' 5 The following
analysis and discussion, and the charts and tables that follow,
will address both the factors relevant to the issuance of those
opinions and their effects on the development of the law.
A. Does Opinion Production Vary Over Time?
1. Assessing Quantity and Quality
How many opinions per year are necessary to develop the
law? Does the number of opinions per supreme court vary much
or is it relatively constant over time? In their study of sixteen
supreme courts between 1870 and 1970, Kagan and his
colleagues found that some supreme courts wrote as many as
500 opinions per year, while others wrote fewer than 100.1 The
average did change over time, but within a comparatively small
range: The average number of opinions per court issued in 1870
was 131, continued to increase to its high point of 291 per state
in 1915, and then decreased into the early 1970s.'1 Professors
Stumpf and Culver observed that
as populations grew and state legislatures shrank from the
task of reforming their judicial systems along more modem
lines, the number of written opinions of some of these
courts rose to as high as 400 or 500 per year (e.g. California
and Michigan); for other state supreme courts (North
14. Geoffrey Stone, Chief Justice Roberts and the Role of the Supreme Court, http://u
chicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/02chief justicejr.html#more (U. Chi. Faculty Blog
Feb. 2, 2007) (accessed May 19, 2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
15. Paul D. Carrington, Daniel J. Meador & Maurice Rosenberg, Justice on Appeal 33-
34 (West 1976).
16. Kagan et. al, supra n. 4, at 960-61.
17. Stumpf & Culver, supra n. 8, at 137. The drop in average number of opinions was
even more dramatic in selected states: In North Carolina the decrease went from 440 in
1910-1915 to 118 in 1970, while in Michigan the decrease went from 413 in 1885 to
ninety-six in 1970. Id.
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Carolina, Alabama, and Minnesota), this figure hovered
18around 300 to 400 per year.
They concluded that the consequences of writing a relatively
high number of opinions are not positive, as doing so results in
"less legal research undertaken in the writing of opinions, fewer
dissents, shorter opinions, and an overall lower quality of output
than these state courts had produced in earlier periods."l 9 And
they point out that these courts' "capacity to articulate carefully
legal policy for the state, and nation, was thus seriously
impaired."2o
One conclusion that could be drawn from this research is
that if law development is the goal, an error-correction method
of evaluation is not appropriate. Consequently, it is not
appropriate to evaluate productivity in courts of last resort based
upon opinion production or to rate states on number of opinions
per justice, just as it would not be appropriate to evaluate state
legislatures by number of bills enacted into law. The quality of
the court decisions and the rationales for the decisions as
documented in the opinion are the appropriate criteria. One great
decision that breaks new ground, reconciles conflicts of laws, or
settles an area of law is worth more than a larger number of
"routine" decisions that are justified by more or less
conventional lines of reasoning.
This would imply that the scholars who explicitly define
productivity for appellate courts as "the number of opinions a
judge publishes in a year"21 should make a distinction between
the functions of courts of last resort and those of intermediate
appellate courts. The statement that "[a]ll else equal, a judge
who publishes more opinions is better than a judge who
publishes fewer opinions,22 may be appropriate for intermediate
appellate courts, which have the primary responsibility for error
correction, but it is not appropriate for courts of last resort,
which are developing the law. This statement also appears to
18. Id. at 137.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Which States Have the Best
(and Worst) High Courts? http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.htm, at 9 (U. Chi.
L. Sch., John M. Olin Program in L. & Econ., Working Paper Series, May 2008) (accessed
May 19, 2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
22. Id.
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attribute opinion production to judges, rather than to collegial
courts. If that is the case, and if the production of more opinions
is to be the measurement, a supreme court justice could be more
"productive" by writing separate concurring or dissenting
opinions, which would be counter to the primary function of
supreme courts to clarify the law and reconcile conflicting
23interpretations.
2. A Snapshot of the Status Quo
As a baseline, what is the average number of opinions
issued in courts of last resort today? Before answering that
question, the definition of opinion used must be clarified. Kagan
and his colleagues counted all opinions of at least one page in
length.24 The ideal would be to identify full written opinions
providing a rationale for the courts' decisions. The NCSC's
Court Statistics Project, in cooperation with the National
Conference of Appellate Court Clerks, has recently
recommended that the standard terms for opinion be "Full
Opinion," "Memorandum Opinion," "Summary/Dispositional
Order," and "Other Opinion." Full opinion is defined as one in
which there is "an expansive discussion and elaboration of the
merits of the case or the defect or procedural error."25 In
contrast, a Memorandum opinion has only a "limited discussion
of the merits of the case or the procedural determination" and
the Summary/Dispositional Order has very little discussion or
comment on the case.26
Unfortunately, this improved method of classification has
just been adopted and the new terminology is not yet in
widespread use. Consequently, we are left with the more
traditional method of classification that emphasizes not the
distinction between a full reasoned opinion and a summary
judgment, but rather the distinction between a signed and an
23. The authors do acknowledge that a judge who publishes more frequently might
write lower quality opinions. Id. at 10.
24. Kagan et al., supra n. 4, at 963. The authors note that this restriction caused them to
exclude "very short memorandum opinions" from their study. Id. at 963 n. 4.
25. Court Statistics Project, National Center for State Courts, The New Appellate
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unsigned opinion. Fortunately, in most cases signed opinions are
most likely to approximate full written opinions, whereas per
curium opinions and memorandum opinions are likely to contain
shorter, more summary conclusions.
Of the fifty-four courts of last resort,28 an average of
twenty-two (between seventeen and twenty-six during the
twenty-year period of the study) report data on per curiam
opinions,29 and that includes courts that report issuing no per
curiam opinions. Only thirteen courts reported the number of per
curiam opinions for at least fifteen of the twenty years studied,
and most of those reported only a small number, with the
average being seventy-five. The exception is the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, which reported the largest number of per curiam
opinions by far, an average of 2,772 annually over the eleven-
year period during which it reported data. The next most prolific
user of per curiam opinions was the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, which reported an average of 520 per curiam
opinions during the twenty-year study period.
Table 130 reveals that the number of signed opinions is
relatively consistent from year to year among states, and even
27. Granted some appellate justices will recall the time when they might have written a
thirty-two-page per curium that settled a point of law in an area, but those are now very
unusual. For the most part, we will not be led too far astray by using "signed opinion" as
the operational definition for "full written opinion." See e.g. Robert J. Hume, The Impact of
Judicial Opinion Language on the Transmission of Federal Circuit Court Precedents, 43
L. & Socy. Rev. 127, 133 (2009) ("It is true that per curiam, or unsigned, opinions are
sometimes used in important cases to express the institutional view of a court or to
summarize the points of consensus among a fractured court.. . . But on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals per curiam opinions are used most commonly in unimportant cases, such as
summary judgments and unpublished decisions.") (citations omitted); see also Howard J.
Bashman, Per Curiam Opinions: What's the Point? http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id
=900005559003 (Dec. 10, 2007) (pointing out that "at the federal appellate level, no
established rules seem to exist concerning when an opinion will be designated per curiam
in place of identifying the judge who has written the decision") (accessed May 19, 2010;
copy on file with Journal ofAppellate Practice and Process).
28. Fifty states plus the District of Columbia and Commonwealth of Puerto Rico would
seem to make fifty-two, but Oklahoma and Texas both have two courts of last resort-a
Supreme Court with largely civil jurisdiction and a Court of Criminal Appeals.
29. The NCSC Court Statistics Project has gathered data on total dispositions, signed
opinions, and per curiam opinions from courts of last resort for at least the past twenty
years, although per curiam opinions are not addressed in detail by this article.
30. Table 1 provides data on the signed opinions issued by supreme courts for the
twenty-year period 1987-2006. To be included on the table, courts of last resort must have
provided data for at least fifteen of the twenty years studied as well as data for the then-
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more so within states. The number of signed opinions in courts
of last resort ranges from fifty-five (Delaware, 1988) to 861
(Alabama, 1991) per year, with an overall average of 190
opinions per year. Table 1 shows the average (mean) number of
signed opinions per court, but also the standard deviation, which
measures the amount of variation in opinions within states from
year to year. Note that the standard deviation for most states is
rather low. To compare opinion production among state supreme
courts with different averages of opinion production per year, a
coefficient of variability (the ratio of the standard deviation to
the size of the mean) was computed. Because the year-to-year
variation was small, meaning that opinion production is
relatively consistent from year to year, it is unnecessary to
conduct separate analyses for each year. The average number of
signed opinions over the twenty years is a good summary
statistic for opinion production per supreme court.
Perhaps we should not be surprised that the number of
signed opinions per court does not vary greatly. At the supreme
court level, the number of justices remains constant and the
number of opinions that they can thoughtfully author has a limit.
One prominent set of scholars says, in fact, that an appellate
justice can participate in 300 cases per year and can author 100
opinions. Leflar's prescription is even more stringent:
[N]o appellate judge, however competent, can write more
than 35, or conceivably 40, full-scale publishable opinions
in a year. The effort to write more risks shoddy opinions
and the shirking other duties, including the preparation of
per curiam and memorandum opinions in less important
32cases.
In sum, a fixed number of justices have a finite capacity to write
full opinions, especially in complex cases, and once that limit is
reached the number of signed opinions per justice must
necessarily level off.
most recent five-year period, which was 2002 to 2006. Forty-one high courts from forty
states had data sufficiently complete and clean to be included in the table.
31. Carrington, Meador & Rosenberg, supra n. 15, at 145-46.
32. Robert A. Leflar, Delay in Appellate Courts, in John A. Martin & Elizabeth A.
Prescott, Appellate Court Delay 151 (NCSC 1981).
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B. Does Opinion Production Vary by Number ofAppellate
Courts?
Although the average number of opinions per state varies
within a fairly narrow band, one might expect a significant
difference between supreme courts over intermediate appellate
courts versus those in states that have only one appellate court.
The highest court in the second group of states must fulfill both
the error-correcting and law-development functions of appellate
courts,33 while the discretionary jurisdiction of the courts in the
first group "ensures that the typical case decided by the justices
will be far more legally ambiguous and more politicall salient
than the typical cases found on other courts' dockets." These
complex cases require more time to research and more
thoughtful opinion writing. With discretionary jurisdiction,
courts of last resort could focus on a smaller number of cases,
"compose longer, more scholarly opinions; issue more dissents;
and generally improve their abilit7 to develop legal doctrine
more thoughtfully for their states."3
The figures that follow this article's text illustrate how
signed opinions vary by number of appellate courts over the
twenty-year time period of this study. Figure 1 is a line graph
showing the number of opinions per year from courts of last
resort in states that have multiple intermediate appellate courts
that are distributed by region. With multiple intermediate
appellate courts to decide the vast majority of cases, the supreme
courts in these states can focus on developing the law, including
the articulation of new principles, the resolution of conflicts
among statutory laws, and the resolution of conflicts in
interpretation among intermediate appellate courts. Figure 2 is a
similar graph, but the data are drawn from courts of last resort in
states having a single intermediate appellate court. Figure 3
33. In fact, intermediate appellate courts were created to guarantee litigants at least one
appeal while providing the supreme courts discretion to choose the appeals they hear.
34. Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential
Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 L. &
Socy. Rev. 135, 139 (Mar. 2006) (referring to the discretionary jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court).
35. Stumpf & Culver, supra n. 8, at 137.
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shows signed opinions from the highest courts in states that do
not have an intermediate appellate court.
Figure 4 displays the average number of signed opinions
per state court of last resort separated into two groups: single
appellate courts and supreme courts in states with one or more
intermediate appellate courts. The hypothesis would be that
single-tier appellate courts would write more opinions because
they need to perform both the error-correcting and law-
development functions, whereas supreme courts in states with
intermediate appellate courts could write fewer because, after
all, the litigants already had the benefit of one appeal even if
their cases were not heard by their states' highest courts.
Surprisingly, however, single appellate courts did not write more
signed opinions than supreme courts in states with intermediate
appellate courts. Indeed, the average number of signed opinions
for single appellate courts was 171, and the average number of
signed opinions in courts of last resort in two-tiered systems was
187. In light of these results, it would appear that courts of last
resort are similar in their production of signed opinions,
regardless of whether they are part of a court system that
includes only a single appellate court or one that includes
multiple appellate courts.
One possible reason for this surprising result may be the
lower volume of appeals in single-appellate-court states and
consequently the lower number of signed opinions from those
courts, but that would presume a relatively constant ratio of
signed opinions per disposition. Is that the case or does the
proportion of signed opinions diminish as the number of
appeals-hence dispositions-increases?
Table 2 shows the ratio of signed opinions to dispositions.
Here it appears as if the high courts in large states do dispose of
more cases per year, which means that the percentage of cases
disposed of by signed opinion is smaller in these states. Table 2
indicates that the California, Illinois, and Michigan Supreme
Courts, the New York Court of Appeals, and the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals dispose of less than fifty percent of their cases
by signed opinions, whereas the Supreme Courts of Arkansas,
Connecticut, Montana, Nebraska, and North Dakota dispose of
more than half of all of their cases by signed opinion. In other
words, the relative number of signed opinions per court remains
115
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relatively constant regardless of the number of total appeals
disposed of by the state's highest court.
C. Does Opinion Production Vary by Number ofJustices?
It would seem logical to assume that collegial courts with
even a few more members would have the capability to write
more opinions than smaller courts. Most state courts of last
resort have seven members, but some do have five, and some
fewer follow the United States Supreme Court with nine
members.36 Figure 5 separates the average number of signed
opinions by the number of justices on each court. There is a
tendency for larger courts to issue more signed opinions, but the
variation within categories is as dramatic as the variation among
courts of different sizes. Five-judge courts issue an average of
167.5 opinions per year, seven-judge courts issue an average of
183.9 opinions per year, and nine-judge courts issue an average
of 269.5 opinions per year. The higher average in the nine-judge
courts, however, is largely driven by the Alabama and
Mississippi Supreme Courts, which not only have nine justices,
but also the ability to sit in panels.37 The Alabama Supreme
36. Most state supreme courts have seven members, eighteen have five members, and
only seven courts of last resort have nine justices: In addition to the Supreme Court of
Alabama, there is the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the Mississippi Supreme
Court, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the Supreme
Court of Texas, and the Washington State Supreme Court.
37. Nine-justice state courts of last resort that may sit in panels are Alabama, District of
Columbia, Mississippi, and Washington. See National Center for State Courts, Court
Statistics Project, Structure Charts, http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/CSPMain
Page.html (click "Access Charts" link in "State Court Structure Charts" box on main
page, then click outline of desired state) (accessed May 20, 2010; copy of "State Court
Structure Charts" page on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). The
Oklahoma and Texas Supreme Courts have nine justices who sit en banc, but those states
both also have second courts of last resort that handle criminal matters and that may also sit
in panels. Id. Most seven-justice courts of last resort sit en banc; the exceptions that use
panels for at least some types of cases are Connecticut, Massachusetts, Nevada, and
Virginia. Id. The Supreme Court of Delaware-a five-justice court-also uses panels. Id.;
see also David Rottman & Shauna Strickland, State Court Organization 2004 at 138
(Bureau of Just. Statistics 2006) (including a reference to the five-member New Mexico
court's "monthly three-judge panel selected to consider and decide substantive and policy-
implicating procedural motions and other matters"). The Rhode Island Supreme Court
reports that court rules permit its members to sit in panels of three, but the general practice
is to hear all matters en banc. Id. at 139. The Vermont Supreme court sits in panels on
cases that are "fast tracked." Id. at 138.
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Court may "exercise all of its powers" in divisions of five
judges, who must reach a unanimous decision or the case goes to
the court as a whole.3 8 Similarly the Mississippi Supreme Court
sits in panels of three justices.39 On the other hand, supreme
courts in Connecticut, Montana, Nevada, and Delaware may
also sit in panels, but these courts are not above average in
opinion production.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The information displayed in the charts and graphs that
accompany this article enable us to draw several important
conclusions:
The number of opinions produced in courts of last resort is
relatively constant from year to year and is not correlated with
the number of appeals disposed. (Although per curiam opinions
were not a focus of the research supporting this paper, available
information indicates that they are used sparingly by most courts
of last resort.)
Single appellate courts do not produce more signed
opinions on average than courts of last resort sitting in states that
also have intermediate appellate courts.
Supreme courts with more justices write only marginally
more opinions than appellate courts with fewer justices.
Although the difference is not as striking, courts of last resort
that sit in panels may issue more opinions than supreme courts
that decide all cases en banc.
Those charts and graphs also enable us to consider the
implications of the information that they present. Perhaps most
important is the realization that appellate courts have two roles
to play: error correction and law development. The obvious
corollary to this realization is the recognition that court
38. Ala. R. App. P. 16(a), (b) (available at http://judicial.alabama.gov/library/rues/ap
16.pdf) (accessed May 20, 2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
39. In certain enumerated circumstances the panels may, however, refer matters to the
Supreme Court as a whole, where they will be "considered and adjudged by the full Court."
Miss. R. App. P. 24(a), (b) (available at http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/rules/msrulesofcourt/
rules-of -appellate procedure.pdf) (accessed May 20, 2010; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
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performance measures must distinguish between these separate
appellate roles.
The data presented here show us too that law development
requires selection of appropriate cases and then the articulation
of reasons behind decisions, especially those that resolve
conflicts of law, create new principles of law, more clearly
articulate principles to guide lower-court decisions, and are
intended to inform the legal community and the public at large
of the rationale for a particular decision.
Finally, because law development requires thoughtful,
considered opinions, these data suggest that appellate courts
should not be evaluated according to the quantity of opinions
produced, but according to the quality of opinions produced,
much in the way that legislatures should not be evaluated
according to the number of statutes passed, but according to the
quality of laws enacted.
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Table 1
Court of Last Resort Si ned Opinions, 1987-2006
State Con 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Alabama SupremeCourt 668 672 751 703 861 738 745 499 430 333 264 307
Alaska Supreme Court 135 193 89 190 103 190 132 145 117 478 179
Arkansas Supreme Coort 358 378 345 373 424 435 424 448 413 379 419 379
California SupremecCourt 85 122 120 100 127 89 102 99 97 102 82 97
Colorado SuprerneCourt 238 244 221 237 227 216 181 192 233 193 214 187
Connecticut Supreme Court 233 230 224 246 253 193 185 185 183 178 165 174
Delaware SupremeCourt 61 55 65 77 53 72 54 66 60 70 82 72
Florida Suprerne Court 195 222 171 199 187 231 231 187 172 175 133 160
Georgia Sopree Cou 374 348 384 384 436 350 316 401 421 404 364 394
Hawaii SupremeCon 314 320 396 318 361 242 81 167 267 262 91 63
Illinois SupemeCourt 176 79 138 128 107 118 158
Indiana SuprerenCourt 363 328 365 219 204 160 139 147 119 124 204 290
Iowa Supreme Court 244 264 257 249 247 240 306 371 270 213
Kansas SpremeCourt 244 380 216 199 203 200 208 210 209 209 208 343
Louisiana SupremeCourt 145 149 137 Ill 91 120 150 76 126 86 70
Michigan Supreme Coon 108 79 68 71 66 75 90 108 95 109 88 121
Minnesota Supreme Coon 156 165 157 157 97 156 120 156 154 151 156
Mississippi supremeCourt 507 475 290 375 312 386 226 236 248 225 231 325
Monrana Supeme Court 359 363 356 387 331 324 437 368 392 372 384 254
Nebraska Supreme Coun 365 487 520 322 508 333 389 276 259 262 267 270
Nevada Supreme Court 142 116 164 155 149 174 177 164 177 169 161 169
New Hampshire SupremeCour 155 144 150 139 163 179 182 144 202 202 135 98
New Mexico Spreme Court 192 220 171 166 188 147 129 56 139 86 60 49
NewYork CourtofAppeals 109 119 118 120 112 118 138 128 184 139 129 106
North Carlina Supreme Court 160 188 119 93 118 99 126 137 152 120 84
North Dakota SupereeCour 249 268 278 281 278 282 225 292 254 259 257 199
Oregon SupremeCour 114 128 102 102 72 116 117 94 64 72 74
Pensylsania Supreme Court 299 268 281 209 299 284 190 165 204 204 207 198
Rhode sland Supreme Court 181 139 141 163 153 126 86 122 216 87
South Carolina Supreme Coon 169 123 457 178 244 233 206 503 557 436 315 166
SouthDakota SupremeCour 186 194 199 159 222 166 204 196 195 183 174 174
Tennessee Supere Court 184 182 182 157 161 211 222 254 296 378 334 339
Texas Supreme Court 93 93 68 66 119 127 145 146 236 183 179 222
Texas Ct. ofCrim. Appeals 214 235 163 170 201 206 198 156 127 130 140
Utah SupremeCourt 182 141 159 Ill 11 103 95 90 116 96 85
Vernon SupreeCort 117 217 221 211 186 138 125 108 94 112 Ill 78
Virginia SupremeCourt 149 183 215 164 144 145 142 168 162 162 131 159
Washington SupremeCourt 134 141 147 119 122 135 134 151 125 139 137 143
Wool Virginia Sup. CL of Appeals 244 249 281 278 274 263 220 275 261 272 188 260
Wisconsin Supreme Court 116 98 107 101 91 87 118 88 87 86 91 73
Wyoming SupremeCourt 196 178 252 161 189 209 188 167 241 180 178 181
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2009 2000 II 9.06
307 473 438
153 170 149 182 139
304 246 321 301 290
88 123 103 101 123
185 93 112 121 85
174 144 120 180 190
62 44 53 71 67
93 191 95 81
394 371 403 364 421
88 59 49 191 69
104 144 130 131 113
186 248 183 195
307 210 107 180 171
183 374 306 312 249
81 62 112 23 15








































































































THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTCE AND PROCESS
CC CCC - CC CC CC CCC CC - CC CC CCC CC CC CCC
CC 0 n - CC CC - CC 0 CCCC CC ,- cC CC -t CC
CC C~ C~C CC 00. C






0CC ~C 000 ' CC







~CCtCCCCC ~ CC CC 0 0 CCC' CC CCCC CC C nt-CO
C
o ~ CC - CC -
C-
CC-
































123LAW DEVELOPMENT IN STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
00 00 00 00 0000--------00
- ~ 000 000
~ _ 00
00 - - 0. - - 00
o 00 - 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 - 000000
00 ocoor- 00 00.~00 _ .00 000000
00 00 00 00 00 r- 00 00 00 00 - 00 00 00 00 00
* *
00 ~ 00
- - 0000000000 00000000000000 000000
00 00.00 0000000000000 00~00000000
004 0000 00400 0000
* * * * * ** * ~ 00-0000-00











o 0. - - - 00 - - -
* * * * * * * * * 000 * * * * * *o 00 00 ~ 00
9
0











0 00. 00 00 00 0 00 00 00 0 0 0 00 0 0
00 < 0 00000 000 00000000
000000000 ~0 0000 00
00 0000000000-0000000
00 0 00 00 00000000000000000000000000000
e~ 0 0 00
0 - -00
0 Ot~-~ -~ ~0000~ 00 00 00 - 0 .0.0 0 00 0

































THIS JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
~~I2INNNNNNNNNNNNNNN NNNNNN
~ N N~NNN N N--N _ _ _ _
- - N N NCN N N N C N N N N N N N
N N N NN.. NNN
N N N C N - N -
NNNCN ~~~~NNNNNN~ ~NNN N - - N N - -
N N N N N N N - N N N N N N N
N - N N - N - N N N - N
N N N N N N N N - N N N N N N N N N N N
NNN~NNN C NNNNN NNN C N N N N
Ni N N C - N N N N N - N - C NNNNNNNN N
N - N N N N N N N N N - N N - C N N N - - N N -
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
) NN NC
~
N N N N N N N N N N N. - - C -   C N N N N C N N N N N
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N C C
~IN N~ - - N - N N
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
1~NNN - -~ N
N N N N ~ N N N N N N
NNN
C C N N N N N N N N N~N _ - - N N N NN N N N N N N N N N N'N
N NN N N.N NN N N N NN. N N CNN N
3
LAW DEVELOPMENT IN STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
N~~NC N N N
N N N CNCNNCNNNN C N




NNN N C N N - N C N N N - C N N
020202 ~
N~~NN
N C N N N N C N C C N N N - N N NN N N N C N N N N N N N C N N N C
N N NNNN NC-N N N N N N N - N





















THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS




























































LAW DEVELOPMENT IN STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
o C~ 0' 0' - 0'
0' 0'
0'- 0'. -~
- ... - - ..t 0' - - -
- 0' 0' 0' - - - - -
0' .0' 0'. 0~ -










0,0' 0' 00' -0'





0' 0' 0' 0' 0' 0' 0' 0' j 0'






0' 000000020 0 0' 0 0 o. 0 0
000000000<2222<22
000000000 Eu o 00 00




0 0 0' 0 0
o ~ ~
2o 02=2
00 0 00 2>2
=000' 0.~ 0 00 o 0 0 0 2220 2 .0 0
127
TiE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
- - - ( N- -( N
-00~N N(
A, y( ( ~ ~ .( E E 7,(N



























































LAW DEVELOPMENT IN STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
* ** *
I C N - - C N - C -
NN~..CS NNN~S
C C CCNNN CON ~ ~
C C N N C N C CC fl N
** & * &* *
n.t~ocr ~I~Crn~Ssoct~
N N S C - N C N
N NNCNNN~S N C -
N N 99 N N C N
** * **CNS2ZCCN
NC~NN~IC
N C C N C N N
N - CC C N
C CCQCC





N - N - - - - N - - - -
C'












~ ci u u u u u ~ u EU U U U U U
Ci ~
o U C C C C C C C C U C C C Ct C C C
5
095 C




















o 0 0p 0 0
o o 0 o o























LAW DEVELOPMENT IN STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS















O-A 04C aC C
0) 040
o o 'T I
131



























LAw DEVELOPMENT IN STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
Figure 4
Average Number of Signed Opinions in State Courts of Last Resort, 1987-2006


















































134 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
Figure 5
Average Number of Signed Opinions in State Courts of Last Resort, 1987-2006













































- I - P -






LAW DEVELOPMENT IN STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
Figure 6
Average Percentage of Signed Opinions/Dispositions In State Courts of Last Resort, 1987-
2006 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
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